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Interplay of Misuse Case and Fault Tree Analysis for Security and Safety 
Analysis 
 
Abstract 
 
Nowadays safety and security are becoming more and more important because of the fact 
that modern information systems are increasingly distributed over web-services, grids and 
clouds. Safety critical systems that were not utilizing usage over Internet are being re-engineered 
in order to be use over Internet. As a consequence of this situation there is need of new methods 
that cover both security and safety aspects of software systems, since these systems are used in 
transportation, health and process control systems that arises risk of physical injury or 
environmental damage. Additionally when safety and security aspects are not considered 
together they may violate each other while one situation is making a case safe it may violate 
security and this is a problem. Such as in the sample of lock doors at dormitories for security 
purpose to protect inhabitants against robbery and some other possible crimes, those inhabitants 
of dormitories use distance keys to unlock them but in case of a fire situation in the building for 
safety purposes these lock doors are unlocking themselves and by activating fire alarms attackers 
can get access to inhabitants properties. In current thesis we introduce integrated domain models 
of security and safety, extracting definitions from safety and security domains and finding 
possible pairs to integrate. Developing interplays between security and safety technique that is 
misuse cases and fault tree analysis. We demonstrate alignment of fault tree analysis to safety 
domain model and making interplay between techniques from fault tree analysis to misuse cases. 
By using the domain models of both security and safety and making interplay between 
techniques we proposed an integrated technique we expect to solve the problem to cover both 
safety aspects of software system benefiting from complementary strengths of security domain 
model and techniques.  
 We believe that our study is contributing to the integration attempts of security and safety 
techniques by illustrating alignment of fault tree analysis with safety domain model benefitting 
from misuse cases and information security risk management relationship and making interplay 
with misuse case technique. And also we illustrate a new methodology on how to use fault tree 
analysis and misuse cases in order to elicit safety concerns in a new information system by 
having interplay with misuse case. Moreover, we test correctness of our methodology by making 
results comparison of a safety risk analyze done.  
Key Words:  
Safety Domain Model, Fault Tree Analysis, Misuse Cases, Security Risk Management. 
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Misuse case´i ja Fault Tree Analyse´i koosmõju turvalisuse ja ohutuse 
uurimisel  
 
Sisukokkuvõte 
 
Ohutus ja turvalisus infosüsteemides muutuvad aasta-aastalt üha olulisemaks. Seda 
seetõttu, et kaasaegsed infosüsteemid on üha enam levinud veebiteenustes, -võrgustikes ja –
pilvedes. Ohutuse seisukohalt olulisi süsteeme, mida ei ole varem Internetis kasutatud, tehakse 
ümber, et muuta neid kasuatatvaks Internetis. Selle tulemusena on tekkinud vajadus leida uusi 
meetodeid, mis kindlustaks nii ohutuse kui turvalisuse tarkvarasüsteemides. Kui ohutust ja 
turvalisust ei käsitleta koos, võivad nad riske suurendada – olukorra ohutuks muutmine võib 
tekitada riski turvalisuses ning sellest tekib probleem. Näiteks lukustatud uksed ühiselamutes 
turvalisuse huvides, kaitsmaks sealseid elanikke röövide ning muude võimalike kuritegude eest. 
Uste avamiseks kasutavad ühiselamu elanikud kaarte, mis uksed avavad. Tulekahju korral aga 
avanevad uksed ohutuse eesmärgil automaatselt ning kurjategijad, lülitades sisse tuletõrjealarmi, 
pääsevad ühiselamu elanike vara juurde.Antud uurimistöös antakse ülevaade ohutusest ja 
turvalisusest kui ühtsest süsteemist, määratledes ohutuse ja turvalisuse mõisted ning otsides 
võimalikke viise nende integreerimiseks, arendades koosmõju ohutuse ja turvalisuse vahel 
kasutades misuse case´i ja fault tree analysis´i. Töös selgitatakse fault tree analysis´i sobivust 
ohutuse domeeni mudelisse ja püütakse leida koosmõju fault tree analysis´i ja misuse case´i 
tehnikate vahel.  
 
Kasutades nii ohutuse kui turvalisuse domeenimudeleid ning tekitades koosmõju 
tehnikate vahel, on oodatud tulemuseks ohutuse ja turvalisuse probleemi lahendamine 
tarkvarasüsteemides. Usutavasti aitab antud uurimistöö kaasa ohutuse ja turvalisuse 
integreerimisvõimaluste leidmisele selgitades fault tree analysis sobivust ohutuse 
domeenimudelisse, kasutades misuse case´i ja information security risk management´i seost ja 
kooskõlastades seda misuse case´i tehnikaga Samuti selgitatakse töös uut metoodikat, kuidas 
kasutada fault tree analysis-d ja misuse case´i selleks, et saavutada nii ohutus kui turvalisus 
kaasaegsetes infosüsteemides. Lisaks sellele testiti töös selgitatud sobivust usaldusväärse 
stsenaariumi korral, mis kinnitab sobivuse paikapidavust. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Ohutuse domeenimudel, fault tree analysis, misuse cases, turvalisuse riskide haldamine 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
 
Trustworthiness of an information system establishes its dependability that allows reliance to be 
justifiable placed on the service it provides. Dependability requirements are the process of 
elicitation and validation of security and safety requirements of a new information system. There 
are different techniques for elicitation and validation of dependable requirements. All these 
techniques have different rules, methodologies and elements. However, since these technologies 
are all concentrated on dependable requirements and all these dependable requirements 
concentrate on what an IS should not do they have similarities. Although there is an express 
difference between the philosophies of security and safety as intentional versus accidental, 
techniques for identifying hazards and threats are common in principle. We know that these 
techniques for security and safety requirements elicitation and validation are similar and 
complementary to each other. Therefore can be used together to generate interplay between 
techniques. 
 
We foresee the possibility of integrated technique of security and safety. Since security and 
safety techniques have cross-pollinations, similarities and each one of these have weaknesses and 
strengths such as safety techniques are more standardized and security techniques are more 
visual. And most important of all they both focused on what an IS system should not do. Also 
when it is considered in some researches security techniques are used as safety techniques by 
doing some conversions in their structures (Winther et al., 2001). But yet preliminary 
investigations showed that there is no actual usage of integration for security and safety 
techniques. Therefore we believe that our study will be make contribution to integration attempts 
of security and safety.  
 
In this thesis information security risk management (ISSRM) and safety domain model (SDM) 
three security risk management languages; Secure Tropos, Mal-Activity Diagrams (MAD), 
Misuse Cases, four safety risk management languages; Hazard and Operability (HAZOP), 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) are covered. Also Misuse Cases ant its alignment to ISSRM (Soomro, 2012) 
covered and FTA and its alignment to SDM illustrated.  
 
In this thesis we resolve two research questions.  
RQ1: What are the similarities and differences between security and safety domain models and 
how can they be benefitted from each other?        
RQ2: What kind of interplay can be done between security and safety techniques for security and 
safety analysis?  
Our contribution in this thesis is FTA and its alignment to SDM. In order to do this alignment we 
have illustrated methodology of FTA along with its ground rules and tested it with SDM on 
running example. From this test we discovered that FTA could only analyze risks related 
concepts from SDM. Therefore, we have decided to use Misuse Case to cover asset model and 
safety requirement model from SDM. By making interplay between techniques we could align 
FTA with SDM. We have also provided step-by-step procedure of how to apply FTA and its 
alignment to SDM in our contribution.   
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The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the overview of thesis along with 
motivation, scope, research question, contribution and structure. Chapter 2 illustrates security and 
safety domain models by giving concept definitions; security domain model concept definitions 
extracted from (Mayer, 2009) and (Dubois et al., 2010) and definitions related to SDM composed 
from (Firesmith, 2003). And presents similarities and differences between security and safety 
domain models. In chapter 3, modelling languages for security and safety risk management are 
given. These are Secure Tropos (Matulevičius et al., 2012), MAD (Sindre, 2007), Misuse Case 
(Sindre et al., 2004) from security and HAZOP (Kletz, 1999), PHA (Ericson, 2005), FMEA 
(Stamatis, 1995), FTA (Brooke et al., 2003) from safety. Chapter 4 presents contribution that is 
FTA and its alignment to SDM showing cross-pollinations between techniques Misuse Case and 
FTA along with methodology and application of the alignment. Chapter 5 describes the 
validation of the contribution in terms of its correctness. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the 
conclusion and future work suggestions. 
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CHAPTER 2. Security and Safety Domains 
 
This chapter introduces security and safety domain models along with their definitions and 
samples to concepts. It also gives similarities and differences of security and security domain 
models. 
2.1 Security Domain Model 
 
Security domain model is the theoretical or conceptual model of all security related risks and its 
various relationships, constraints, attributes to prevent or reduce the severity of the risk impact on 
asset. Main focus of security domain model is security risk management that is describing the 
road map of identifying valuable assets, deciding on risk levels and risk treatments, dictating 
security criterion for reducing the likelihood of undesirable events. There exist several security 
risk management methodologies as CORAS (Braber et al., 2007), Automated Risk and Utility 
Management (AURUM) (Ekelhart et al., 2009), ISSRM (Dubois et al., 2010) and Goal-Risk 
driven assessment (Asnar et al., 2010). In our study we chose to use ISSRM as our security 
domain model becauese it presents three major groups we think it is important in risk 
identification as asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk treatment-related concepts 
(Mayer et.al., 2009). Moreover, ISSRM is applicable to Misuse-Cases that is the security risk 
identification technique and going to be used to make interplay with (Soomro, 2012). 
2.1.1 ISSRM Definitions 
The definitions related to ISSRM study is done by (Mayer, 2009) and (Dubois et al., 2010). In 
Mayer’s study extracted definitions from different resources are collected. This paper will 
introduce definitions for concepts of ISSRM Domain Model presenting them from Dubois’s 
definitions and selecting them through Mayer’s collection of definitions.  
The definitions related to ISSRM are extracted from (Dubois et al., 2010) 
Asset: Anything that has value to the organization and necessary for achieving its objectives.  
Business asset: Information, process, skill inherent to the business of the organization that has 
value to the organization in terms of its business model and is necessary for achieving its 
objectives.  
IS asset: A component or part of the IS that has value to the organization and is necessary for 
achieving its objectives and supporting business assets. 
Security criterion: Property or constraint on business assets that characterizes their security 
needs. Security criteria acts as indicators to assess the significance of a risk. 
Risk: The combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities leading to a negative impact 
harming one or more of the assets. Threat and vulnerabilities are part of the risk event and impact 
is the consequence of the risk. 
Impact: The potential negative consequence of a risk that may harm assets of a system or an 
organization, when a threat (or an event) is accomplished. 
Event: The combination of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities. 
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Vulnerability: The characteristic of an IS asset or group of IS assets that can constitute a 
weakness or a flaw in terms of IS security. 
Threat: Potential attack, carried out by an agent that targets one or more IS assets and that may 
lead to harm to assets. A threat is constituted of a threat agent and an attack method. 
Threat agent: An agent that can potentially cause harm to assets of the IS. A threat agent 
triggers a threat and is thus the source of a risk. 
Attack method: Standard means by which a threat agent carries out a threat. 
Risk treatment: The decision of how to treat the identified risks. A treatment satisfies a security 
need, expressed in generic and functional terms, and can lead to security requirements. 
Security requirement: A condition over the phenomena of the environment that we wish to 
make true by installing the IS, in order to mitigate risks. 
Control (also called countermeasure or safeguard): A designed means to improve security, 
specified by a security requirement, and implemented to comply with it. 
 
2.1.2 Samples to Security Domain Model Concepts  
Security domain model has some concepts as it has shown in Fig 1. In our example we will focus 
on giving samples to each of these concepts regarding a car theft scenario. 
 
Fig 1. The ISSRM Domain Model; adopted from (Dubois et al., 2010) and (Mayer, 2009) 
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 A medium sized telecommunication company has company cars for maintenance works. 
Employee is using these cars. None of these cars have immobilizer system. Car thieves having 
the knowledge of which car has immobilizer which not and how to hot wire a car targeting this 
company’s car for stealing purpose. 
Table 1 illustrates samples to each class of the domain model in Fig 1 regarding the 
scenario above. 
Table 1. Samples to Security Domain Model Concepts 
Asset Company property.   
Business asset Car. 
IS asset Ignition start. 
Security criterion Confidentiality of the car. 
Risk Car thief steals the car. 
Impact -Negates the integrity of the car. 
Event Car thief uses screwdriver to accomplish hot wire technique in order to 
start the engine and since the car has no immobilizer system avoiding 
it being hot-wired car thief starts the engine successfully and steals the 
car. 
Vulnerability Unsecure ignition start, no immobilizer system avoiding the car being 
hot-wired.  
Threat Car thief using hot wire technique to steal the car. 
Threat agent Car thief using screwdriver. 
Attack method -Insert a slotted screwdriver into the ignition and turn over it like a 
regular key. 
Risk treatment Risk avoidance.  
Security 
requirement 
Car engine should not be able to start unless the correct key (or other 
token) used. 
Control Correct key triggers a small electromagnetic field, which induces 
current to flow inside the key body, which in turn broadcasts a unique 
binary code that is read by the automobile's Engine Control Unit 
(ECU). When the ECU determines that the coded key is both current 
and valid, the ECU activates the fuel-injection sequence and the 
engine starts. 
 
2.2 Safety Domain Model 
 
SDM is the theoretical or conceptual model of all safety related risks and its various 
relationships, constraints, attributes to prevent or reduce the severity of the risk harm on asset. 
Comparing to safety, security is more embedded to guidelines and standards however yet our 
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preliminary investigations showed there exist no domain model for safety. As a consequence of 
this adopting the information model for safety engineering presented by (Firesmith, 2003) we 
have proposed SDM that is shown in Fig 2. 
 
2.2.1 Definitions Related to SDM 
The definitions related to SDM composed by us from (Firesmith, 2003). We demonstrate 
definitions for all concepts of SDM Fig 2. 
Asset: Asset is everything that could be considered as valuable to protect from harm. The why 
reason asset needs protection is because it affects from accident somehow. Such as being part of 
the accidental system, external to the accidental system, future participant of the accidental 
system or participants having no intentional involvement to the system. 
Safety goal: Safety goal is the target of safety level or one of safety sub factors that is expected 
to meet by the information system. These safety sub factors are asset protection, safety incident 
detection, safety incident reaction and system adaptation. 
Safety risk: Safety risk is accidental harm to an asset that is possible to occur when potential 
risks come true due to ignoring actual safety risk or vulnerability. 
 
Accident: Accident is series of events or one single event resulting with harm to an asset that is 
unplanned and unintended of creating it. Accidents may result in damage to environment, health 
or property. 
 
Vulnerability: Vulnerability is weak points in the system in terms of safety that is increasing the 
chance of possible accidental situation. These weak points occur due to design, implementation, 
architecture or deployment mistakes and result with harm to the asset. 
 
Hazard: Hazard is the situations that is potentially or actually increasing the chances of 
accidental situations.  Hazardous states can be both potential and actual. 
 
Harm: Harm is specific damage an asset gets because of a hazardous situation turning into 
reality and causing accidental situation. 
 
Safety policy: Safety policy is defined unacceptable potential risks by software engineers. It 
mandates information system to follow the safety policy context in order to avoid situations 
resulting with harm. 
 
Safety requirement: Safety requirement specifies and dictates the minimum needed measure of 
safety information system has to reach to ensure quality in terms of safety.  
 
Safety mechanism: Safety mechanism is the architectural mechanism that aims to reduce 
chances of accidental situations by fulfilling safety requirements. 
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Fig 2. SDM; adopted from (Firesmith, 2003) 
2.2.2 Samples to SDM Concepts 
SDM has concepts as it has shown in Fig 2. In our sample we will focus on giving examples to 
each of these concepts within the context of the following scenario. At a dormitory due to 
privacy concerns there exists lock doors at each floor for security purposes to protect inhabitants 
against robbery and some other possible crimes, those inhabitants of dormitories use distance 
keys to unlock them to get in to their floors and get out. In case of a fire situation these doors are 
getting unlocked automatically. However there exist no manual way of opening these doors to 
put it another way if the doors would not open automatically in fire situation there is no manual 
way to open them. Thus in a fire situation dormitory inhabitant may not vacate the premises and 
got poisoned by smoke.  
 
Table 2 illustrates samples to each concept of the domain model in Fig 2 regarding the scenario 
above. 
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Table 2. Samples to SDM Concepts 
Asset Dormitory inhabitant. 
Safety goal Asset protection. 
Safety risk Dormitory inhabitant cannot vacate the premises.  
Accident Dormitory inhabitants get stuck in the building. 
Vulnerability There exist no way to unlock the doors manually. 
Hazard Lock doors not get unlocked in fire situation. 
Harm Dormitory inhabitant that got poisoned by smoke  
Safety policy When the fire alarm is active lock doors should automatically get 
unlocked. 
Safety 
requirement 
In order dormitory inhabitants to vacate the premises as soon as possible 
all lock doors should be unlocked. 
Safety 
mechanism 
Smoke detectors should activate the fire alarm and extinguishers. 
Activated fire alarm should unlock all the lock doors. 
In order lock doors to open manually lock covers should be made of 
plastic thus inhabitants can break them and vacate the premise 
 
2.3 Correspondence between Security and Safety Domains 
 
We believe that domain models of safety and security can give an idea on how to make interplay 
between security and safety. Therefore in order to investigate which concepts are likely to be 
benefitted from each other or make interplay with we compared security and safety domain 
models by identifying their similarities and differences. Concepts we think that have similar 
goals from security and safety domains are compared. The table below (See Table 3) gives an 
overview of similarities and differences between these concepts.  
In Table 3, similarities and differences between security and safety domain models compared. 
Considering the Table 3, we can say that although some concepts have different names in 
security and safety domains they have similar goals and can be compared such as (i.e., Event), 
(i.e., Harm). And there are some concepts, which exist for security and do not exist in SDM such 
as (i.e., Threat agent), (i.e., Attack method). Also some concepts have no difference in 
comparison such as (i.e., Asset). Regarding this comparison we could say that in terms of asset 
model security and safety domain models can be used in common because they both are 
concerned with to protect what is valuable from harm for safety and impact for security. 
Although, there is a slight different between harm and impact as harm is actual damage and 
impact is potential, they are both connected to asset and can be modeled together.    
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Table 3. Similarities and Differences  
Concept from 
Security 
Concept from 
Safety 
Similarities Differences 
Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk -Consequences of both risks 
directly connected with asset. 
-Both of them are predictable up 
to some point. 
-Security risk occurs due to an 
intentional negative incident on 
information system however safety risk 
occurs with accidental negative 
incidents. 
Event 
 
 
Accident -Both of them are triggered with 
an incidents or incidents having 
negative impact on information 
system 
-Event is combination of a threat and 
vulnerabilities however accident is 
combination of hazard and 
vulnerabilities. 
Impact Harm -Both of them are occurring due 
to a specific solid reason. 
-Both causes value loss to asset. 
 
-Impact is a potential harm to an 
information system. However, harm is 
specific actual damage.  
Threat Hazard -Both of them are concerning 
potential future unplanned value 
loss occasions. 
-Both of them may cause value 
loss situations to the asset. 
 
-Threat has agents having strategies to 
harm the asset (nothing happens 
randomly).  
-Threat has one state that is potential 
-However, hazard has potential and 
actual states.  
-And harms the asset with unplanned 
accidental occasions.  
Vulnerability Vulnerability -Both of them are weaknesses 
increasing susceptibility of the 
system. 
-No difference found. 
Security criterion 
 
 
Safety goal 
 
-Both of them are setting the 
minimum required standards 
information system is looking 
for in order to protect the asset. 
-Security criterion has security 
objectives safety goal has sub factors.  
Asset Asset -Both of them are valuable 
-Both of them need protection 
for unplanned value loss 
occasions. 
-Both of them have the same 
sphere of stakeholder influence. 
-No difference found. 
Risk treatment Safety policy -Both of them are concerning 
about managing the risk/s. 
-Actions taken for both of them 
are based on written standards 
and have boundaries. 
-A software engineer can specifically 
create definition and appliance of risk 
treatment for an information system.  
However, safety policy involves 
political, economic and moral decisions 
outside the decision-making realm of the 
software engineer. 
Security 
requirement 
 
 
 
Safety 
requirement 
-Both of them are quality 
requirements. 
-Both of them are specifying 
what needed in order to protect 
the asset. 
-Security requirements have to meet 
qualities that are important to 
organization such as confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. However, 
safety requirements have to meet 
specific safety policy. 
Control Safety 
mechanism 
 
 
 
-Both of them have the intention 
to decrease chances of 
unplanned value loss. 
-Both of them have criterion on 
how to reduce the chances of 
unplanned value loss.   
-No difference found. 
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2.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have presented security and safety domain models along with their concept 
definitions and samples to these concepts. For security we have presented ISSRM and for safety 
we have adopted a model from (Firesmith, 2003). We have also presented correspondence 
between security and safety domain models by focusing on their similarities and differences. 
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CHAPTER 3. Modeling Languages for Security and Safety Risk Management 
	  
This chapter introduces, modeling languages for security and safety risk management. Among 
the security risk management languages, Secure Tropos, MAD and Misuse Case together with its 
alignment to ISSRM introduced. Among safety risk management languages, HAZOP, PHA, 
FMEA and FTA along with its methodology and introduced.  
 
3.1 Security Risk Oriented Modeling Languages 
 
Security risk oriented modeling languages helps us for elicitation and validation of security 
requirements, they expose us to view hidden requirements. Some of these languages are based on 
textual descriptions, some of them are with diagrams and some of them covers both textual and 
diagram representations. In our study we introduced most frequently used security risk oriented 
modeling languages such as Secure Tropos, MAD and Misuse Case (Raspotnig, et al., 2013). 
3.1.1 Secure Tropos 
Description: Tropos is a software development methodology, which uses agents’ concept 
through four development processes that are early and late requirements, architectural and 
detailed design (Bresciani et al., 2004). Secure Tropos is security-based extension of tropos that 
allows modeling security sensitive scenarios from the early stages of the development process 
(Matulevičius et al., 2012). 
Structure: Secure tropos supports analysis of security through development processes based on 
different models. Security enhanced actor model analysis actors of the environment, actors of the 
system and dependency relationships between these (Matulevičius et al., 2012). Secure Tropos 
has actors, goals, soft goals, hard goals, resource and plan. Considering security related concept it 
has security constraint and thread. There are also dependencies between elements with dependee 
and depender. In it is detail an actor has intention and goal regarding the system. Their role 
represents the characteristics of an actor. These actors have soft goals and hard goals and in 
general the basic difference between these two can be described as; soft goal captures non-
functional requirements and hard goal captures functionality requirement of a system 
(Matulevičius et al., 2012). In Tropos different alternative tasks to achieve a specific goal are 
modeled. There might be dependencies between users such as to achieve one goal a user may 
need another user to execute a task.  
3.1.2 Mal-Activity 
Description: MAD are the usage of unified modeling language (UML) diagrams with the exact 
same syntax and semantics to cover security aspects of systems in early development phases with 
some additions to UML (Sindre, 2007).  
Structure: MAD have some additions to UML diagrams to capture negative scenarios as 
following: malicious activities are shown with icons that are inverse of normal activities, 
malicious actors are shown using white text on black background and their names are written as 
inverse where they have indicated swim lanes, malicious decision boxes shown as inverse of 
normal decision boxes and they are liable with making the best decision for malicious purpose. 
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3.1.3 Misuse Cases  
Description: Uses cases are one of the most frequently used elements during requirements 
engineering, however they offer very limited for elicitation of security requirements (Sindre et 
al., 2004). That is why we there exist an approach called misuse cases to extend traditional use 
cases to also cover security requirements. In order to work with misuse cases there are five steps 
listed as follows; identify critical assets, define security goals, identify threats, identify and 
analyze risks and define security requirements respectively. In our study we are going to use 
misuse cases among security risk identification techniques because of the fact that it has detailed 
and well structured textual representation and frequently used technique in empirical studies 
(Raspotnig, et al., 2013) and most important of all has alignment with ISSRM (Soomro, 2012).  
Structure: Use cases have two basic elements such as use case and actor.  Similarly misuse 
cases have two basic elements as well such as misuse cases and misusers.  Misuse cases can be 
described as consequences of series of actions with some certain harm done by misusers and 
misusers can be described as actors intentionally or accidentally making misuse cases scenario 
real. Diagram use cases relationships are include, extend, mitigate, threaten or exploits. Diagram 
shows how the misuser can cause harm to the system using the following elements such as 
actors, cases and their relations with each other. There also exist textual representation for misuse 
cases. 
3.2 Alignment of Misuse Cases to ISSRM 
 
The main reason for this alignment is to see the capabilities of misuse cases with the correlation 
of ISSRM. Following with this we may have a chance to identify security concerns at an early 
stage of software development and see potential security problems from a different point of view 
(Soomro, 2012). This alignment covers core concepts of ISSRM such as asset-related concepts, 
risk-related concepts, risk-treatment related concepts and risk management process. In our study, 
we apply our scenario of car theft  (Section 2.1.2) to show how misuse cases can be for security 
risk management illustrating both textual and graphical representations with a running as follows. 
3.2.1 Textual Representation Sample: Various templates have been suggested for the textual 
description of misuse cases but in our running example we will use the template suggested by 
(Sindre, et., 2001). Graphical representation gives the overall view of the requirements. 
However, textual representation captures the real essence of use cases. They also encourage 
developers to explain the story with plain sentences. There exist misuse case templates as 
lightweight and extensive (detailed) (Sindre et al., 2001). In our study we used the detailed 
textual representation deviated from (Kulak, et al., 2000) by (Sindre et al., 2001).  See Table 4 
for the example. 
3.2.2 Graphical representation sample: Illustrates the interaction between actor and misuser 
with the system and specifications of set of actions performed. Fig 3, Fig 4, Fig 5 uses graphical 
representation of misuse cases. Diagrams uses all legends of use cases except extends and some 
special legends as misuse case, threatens, mitigates, exploits security criteria and misuser.  
Asset model 
In Fig 4, we present the context of car theft modeled in a use case diagram together with security 
criterions. According to ISSRM domain model we considered  “drive car” as business asset, 
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“ignition start” as IS asset and confidentiality of the car as security criterion. The example 
focuses on “driver” and “car thief” who are getting into interaction with the asset that is the car. 
Business use case (i.e., drive the car) includes (i.e., Start the engine). Security criterions 
represented in hexagons (i.e., Confidentiality of the car, Integrity of the car) are constraints of, 
business use case (i.e., drive the car). 
Table 4. Example of the detailed misuse case template 
Name Steal the car. 
Summary Stolen car from that is company property. 
Author Servet Kurt 
Date 14.03.14 
Basic path bp1: Car thief breaks the window of the car. 
bp2: Opens the door. 
bp3: Gets in to the car. 
bp4: Slots a screwdriver into the ignition and turn over it like a 
regular key. 
bp5: Starts the engine. 
bp6: Runs away with the car. 
Alternative paths ap1: Doors of the car unlocked. No breaking the window of the car is 
necessary. (Changes step bp1). 
ap2: Window of the car is open. No breaking the window of the car 
is necessary. (Changes step bp1). 
Capture points cp1: Car alarm starts ringing when the window of the car is broken 
(in step bp1) 
cp2: Engine does not start because there is immobilizer (in step bp2) 
Mitigation points as1:  Toaster can not be moved away from kitchen worktable because 
it is tied up to worktable (in bp5), (extension point ext1) 
Extension points [..] 
Trigger tr1: Always true, this can happen anytime. 
Pre conditions pr1: Car does not have car alarm. 
pr2: Car does not have immobilizer. 
Assumptions as1: Car thief’s screwdriver fits with the ignition (for all paths). 
Worst case threat wc.1:Car thief stole the car and run away. 
Mitigation guarantee mg1.:Immobilizer  avoids car thief to start the engine with hot wire 
technique. 
mg2: Car alarm rings when the window of the car is broken. 
Related business rules: br1.: Company cars belongs to company and only authorized 
personnel  can use them. 
br2: According to company rules during the work hours specified 
personnel has all the responsibility of the car. 
Potential misuser 
profile 
Experienced car thief who has knowledge on what type of cars may 
have immobilizer and hot wire technique. 
Stakeholder and 
threats:  
Company: Loses money if the car has stolen and maintenance works 
company does delays.  
Driver: Company’s trust decreases to the employee. May lose the 
job. 
Scope Entire business 
Abstraction level Goal of the car thief. 
Precision level Focused 
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3.2.2 Graphical representation sample: Illustrates the interaction between actor and misuser 
with the system and specifications of set of actions performed. Fig 3, Fig 4, Fig 5 uses graphical 
representation of misuse cases. Diagrams uses all legends of use cases except extends and some 
special legends as misuse case, threatens, mitigates, exploits security criteria and misuser.  
Asset model 
In Fig 4, we present the context of car theft modeled in a use case diagram together with security 
criterions. According to ISSRM domain model we considered “drive car” as business asset, 
“ignition start” as IS asset and confidentiality of the car as security criterion. The example 
focuses on driver and car thief who are getting into interaction with the asset that is the car. 
Business use case (i.e., drive the car) includes (i.e., Start the engine). Security criterions 
represented in hexagons (i.e., Confidentiality of the car, Integrity of the car) are constraints of, 
business use case (i.e., drive the car). 
 
Fig 3. Asset Modeling 
 
Risk model 
In Fig 4, we present potential threat scenario. Misuser (i.e., Car Thief) initiates a misuse case 
(i.e., Hot wire the ignition includes run away with the car) by exploiting the vulnerability (i.e., 
Unsecure ignition start) that includes, IS asset (i.e., Start the engine). In Fig 4, the vulnerability is 
represented by filled grey use case. Misuse case (i.e., Hot wire the ignition) threatens the IS asset 
(i.e., Start the engine) and leads to (i.e., Car thief run away with the car) that negates the security 
criterion (i.e., Confidentiality of the car). The threat (i.e., hot wire the ignition) leads an impact 
on business asset (i.e., Drive the car).  
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Fig 4. Risk Modeling 
 
Risk treatment model 
ISSRM domain model supports the risk treatment, control and its implementation. However, security 
risk oriented misuse cases do not support the modeling of these concepts. So security requirement is 
modeled as a security use case (Soomro, 2012). Security use case is represented with a lock inside 
(see Fig. 5). In Fig. 5, we present the security requirement for identified threats in our example. The 
security use case mitigates the misuse case (i.e., Hot wire the ignition). It ensures security criterion 
(i.e., Confidentiality of the car) imposed by business use case (i.e., Drive car). 
 
Fig 5. Security Requirement Modeling 
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3.3 Safety Risk Management Languages 
  
Dependence on programmable equipment is increasing and these equipment the ones such as 
transportation and control system are under risk of physical injury or environmental damage that 
are aggregated as safety related risks (Sindre, et al., 2004). In order to identify these risks there 
exists some safety management languages. In our study we introduced the most frequently used 
safety risk identification techniques, which are HAZOP, PHA, FMEA and FTA (Raspotnig et al., 
2013).  
 
3.3.1 Hazard and Operability 
Description: HAZOP is a method, which identifies hazards and problems to provide efficient 
operation. It indicates both hazards and operational threads in a system and makes analysis of 
them. At the same time HAZOP is a technique, which provides an approach to people letting 
them use their imagination and do iterative work by giving opportunity to team members 
stimulate each others ideas and build upon each other (Kletz, 1999).   Also by this way chance of 
missing something is being reduced.  
 
Structure: Analysis are being held using guidewords in a textual way such as none, more of, less 
of, part of, more than (as well as), other than. There exist deviations generated by each 
guideword as it is shown in the table 4 below. With these guidewords and their deviations 
generated analyzers of a team asks iterative questions. Same procedure applies with same 
questions to the next guideword. In order to avoid missing a detail analyses perform in a 
systematic way, so each sort of hazard considered in turn (Kletz, 1999). 
 
Table 5. Deviations Generated by Each Guideword are taken from (Kletz, 1999) 
Guide word Deviations 
None No forward flow when there should be  
More of More of any physical property than there should be 
Less of Less of any physical property than there should be  
Part of Composition of system different from what it should be  
More than More components present in the system than there should be 
Other than What else can happen apart from normal operation 
 
 
3.3.2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis  
Description: PHA is a tool to elicit initial safety requirements in system, in other words potential 
or suspected hazards that may affect the design safety when the actual detailed design is not 
available yet. PHA identifies safety issues such as hazards, their casual associated factors, 
effects, level of risk and methods to mitigate these and affects the design safety (Ericson, 2005). 
Structure: Starting point for PHA is analyzing hazards in detail concurrent from preliminary 
hazard list (PHL), which is collection of identified hazards. For example if a system is using gas 
generators analyst checks the PHL and obviously finds gas generators as hazardous element and 
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that gas generators explosion is a potential mishap together with many hazards. Next step is 
checking hazard checklist, which is a collection of known hazardous items and undesired mishap 
checklists. Afterwards, collaboration of these lists as PHL, hazard checklist and mishap 
checklists with system design PHA worksheets are created. These worksheets have columns such 
as hazard, causes, effects, recommended actions and comments. When these worksheets are done 
PHA report is created for identified risks, mishaps, hazards and mitigation methods (Ericson, 
2005). 
3.3.3 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
Description: FMEA is a reliability procedure that analysis every possible failure in system 
design based on its ground rules. There exist four types of FMEA s as System FMEA, Design 
FMEA, Process FMEA and Service FMEA (Stamatis, 1995). 
1. System FMEA analyzes systems and subsystems in early design stages. 
2. Design FMEA analyzes products before they start manufacturing. 
3. Process FMEA analyze manufacturing and assembling processes.  
4. Service FMEA analyzes services before they received by customer.  
Structure: FMEA has step-by-step bottom up approach. Meaning that failures of all components 
are being identified during FMEA procedure and their effects on overall system, which is 
creating, undesired events. Failure mode stands for component, service, procedure and design 
fail. They can be any errors or defects resulting in harm to the system, design, service or 
procedure. In FMEA failures can be prioritized according to their effects. Effect analysis stands 
for consequences of failures. Local effect stands for failure effect that is happening to the item 
under analysis. System effect stands for overall effect that is consequence of local effect. 
Corrective action stands for prevention ways to failure modes. FMEA is used for identifying 
actual risks on running system for continuous improvement or risks of failures to lower the 
chances of failures or prevent (Nancy, 2004). 
 3.3.3.1 FMEA Running Example 
Sample scenario is taken from (Nancy, 2004), which is about a bank's ATM system. Table 6, 
illustrates the use case "Dispense Cash" and failure modes related with that function.  
In order to create this table for the given function "dispense cash" following steps performed are 
performed:  
1. Understand the scope of system and purpose of the function wants to be analyzed which 
is “Dispense Cash” in our scenario.  
2. Identify type of FMEA. For our scenario FMEA identified as "service" for the function 
"dispense cash" among four different types of FMEA.  
3. Create FMEA table (See Table 6) 
4. Identify in what ways “Dispense Cash” may fail. These are about potentially in what 
ways a failure could happen. We call them as failure modes.  
5. Identify what are the local and system effect of the failures. Meaning that what kind of 
consequences will come up with these failures, locally and consequences of local failure 
on system. 
6. Identify corrective actions to prevent failure modes. 
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Table 6. FMEA Example for "Dispense Cash" adopted from (Nancy, 2004). 
Unit “Dispense Cash” 
Failure mode Local effect System effect Corrective action 
Does not 
dispense cash 
Customer 
dissatisfied. 
Bank loses 
customer. 
• Internal low cash alert. 
• Loading procedure 
(riffle end of stack) 
• Increase bandwidth to 
decrease heavy network 
traffic.  
Dispenses too 
much cash 
Bank loses money. Bank goes 
bankruptcy.  
Takes too long 
to dispense cash 
Customer gets 
annoyed. 
Bank loses 
customer. 
 
 
Table 7 FMEA and SDM 
 
SDM 
FTA and its Alignment to SDM FMEA 
FTA element Misuse case 
diagram 
FMEA element 
A
ss
et
 
 
Asset - Use case - 
Safety goal - Safety element - 
Vulnerability - - - 
R
is
k   
Safety risk Fault Tree  - 
Accident Basic event - System Effect 
Hazard Intermediate 
event, 
undeveloped 
event. 
- Failure Mode 
Vulnerability - Vulnerability use 
case 
- 
Harm Intermediate 
event. 
Impact element Local Effect 
R
is
k 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
 
Safety policy - - - 
Safety 
requirement 
- Safety use case Corrective action 
Safety 
mechanism 
- - - 
 
 
 
27 
3.3.3.2 FMEA and SDM 
There exist no alignment of FMEA with SDM. However, we have proposed alignment of FTA 
with SDM and considering the fact that FTA supplements FMEA (Stamatis, 1995) and their 
relationship in terms of the literature they rely on are common we have created a table (See Table 
7) showing FTA elements with SDM and engagement of FMEA to it.  
Table 7 shows that FTA and FMEA both elicits accident, hazard and harm. A part from this 
FMEA covers safety requirements that in our alignment we have covered it using Misuse Case. 
But safety risk that FTA covers is not covered by FMEA. Regarding our validation for FTA and 
its alignment to SDM, as also Table 7 shows that it is possible to make comparison for its 
correctness because Misuse Case and FTA is already aligned with SDM and a risk analysis made 
by FMEA and Misuse Cases can be compared with FTA and its alignment to SDM since FTA 
supplements FMEA and literature they rely on are common (Stamatis, 1995). 
 
3.3.4 Fault Tree Analysis  
Description: FTA is a top down, deductive failure analysis using Boolean logic to expose 
undesirable states of system and combine it with series of lower-level events. FTA uses to 
understand in what ways a system can fail, what are the risks and what are the best ways to 
reduce these risks. General implementation area of FTA is aerospace, chemical and nuclear 
power industries (Brooke et al., 2003). 
Structure:  FTA constructs a tree starting with initial undesired event at the root and connections 
of either primary or intermediate events with gates to each other. There exist three main construct 
elements as primary fault symbols, gate symbols and transfer symbols and their sub elements 
(See Fig 6.).  
 
Fig 6. FTA Metamodel 
Some of the key elements of FTA are and, or, conditioning event, undeveloped event and 
intermediate event. AND describes logical operation where all input events are necessary to have 
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the output event. OR describes logical operation where only one input event is necessary to have 
the output event. CONDITIONING EVENT is basic fault input, which requires no further 
development and branching (end branches of the fault tree). UNDEVELOPED EVENT is a basic 
fault event that is not developed its causes. INTERMEDIATE EVENT is fault event that is 
caused by failures and needs further developments (branching).  
Table 8. Fault Tree Symbols 
 
 
 
Basic 
event 
 
 
 
 
Conditioning 
event 
 
 
 
 
Undeveloped 
event 
 
 
 
 
 
External 
event 
 
 
 
Intermediate 
event 
 
 
 
 
AND 
 
 
 
 
 
OR 
 
 
 
 
Exclusive OR 
 
 
 
 
Exclusive 
AND 
 
 
 
 
INHIBIT 
 
 
 
 
 Transfer IN 
 
 
 
 
Transfer OUT 
 
3.3.4.1 General Steps For Fault Tree analysis 
A Fault tree should only be created when the analysis of the system is done and it is understood 
how the system functions. 
Steps 
1- First analyst defines the system and it’s boundaries. It explains initial condition of system that 
is needed for failure information.  
2- Define the undesired event to be analyzed. This should be a problem of interest that analysis 
will address such as a particular system failure. 
3- Determine the treetop structure such as with intermediate events. These will be the events that 
directly lead to the top event. 
4- Determine the events that directly lead to each intermediate event until the fault tree model is 
complete and explore the fault tree for the combinations of events contributing to initial 
undesired event. By determining the immediate, necessary and sufficient causes for the 
occurrence of the top event. 
5- Perform quantitative analysis.  
There needs to be made a probability calculation in this step. However, for computerized systems 
especially for distributed systems it is difficult to assign useful probabilities to the events due to 
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the fact that these systems have discrete, non-linear nature (Brooke et al., 2003). Instead analyst 
should carry out the risk analysis and observe how the system may fail. 
6- Interpret results for identifying vulnerabilities in the system in order to reduce the risks that 
are associated with these risks.  
3.3.4.2 Fault Tree Construction Ground Rules  
When we determine about a specific problem to create fault tree the following below rules should 
be applied to explain what such events actually are and how they should be structured in the tree. 
These ground rules are suggested for fault tree construction by (Fault Tree Handbook, 1981). 
Ground Rules  
1-Write the statements, which will be entered in the event boxes as faults by stating precisely 
what the fault is, and when it occurs. 
2-Examine these boxed statements and ask the following question: “Can this fault consist of a 
component fault?”   If  “yes” then classify this event as “state of component fault” and use 
Ground Rule 2.1 if “no” then classify this event as “state of system fault” and use Ground Rule 
2.2 
2.1 Add an OR gate below the event and look for primary, secondary and command 
modes.  
2.2 Look for minimum immediate, necessary and sufficient cause or causes. That may 
branch with an AND, OR, INHIBIT or no gate at all. 
3-No gate-to-gate relationships are possible. Analyst has to put an event between two gates. 
4-No miracles rule. The normal functioning of a component propagates a fault sequence, then it 
is assumed that component functions normally. Meaning those things that would normally occur 
as the result of a fault will occur, and only those things.    
5-Complete the gate rule. All inputs to a particular gate should be completely defined before 
further analysis of any of them undertaken. 
3.4 Fault Tree Analysis and Construction Sample 
 
 
 
Fig 7. Simple Battery Powered Circuit taken from NASA HQ Bill Vesley 
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Above steps given for FTA and construction rules are followed in the running example of simple 
battery powered circuit (See Fig. 7).  
Steps 
1- Intended Function: Motor is used for some purpose that is not known.  
Physical Boundaries: Battery. 
Analytic Boundaries: Switch, Motor, Battery, transition elements.  
Initial Condition: Switch open. Motor does not work. 
2- Top event: Motor does not start when the switch is open. 
3.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have presented different modeling languages for security and safety 
risk management along with their descriptions and plain structures. For security Secure Troops, 
MAD, and Misuse Case and its alignment to ISSRM presented. For safety HAZOP, PHA, FMEA 
and FTA presented. For FTA, we have also presented its meta-model (See Fig 6.), diagram 
elements (See Table 8), methodology and a construction sample. Methodology we have 
presented for FTA includes its ground rules and general steps needs to be followed in order to 
apply it. We also presented application of FTA with a running example from NASA HQ Bill 
Vesley “Simple Battery Powered Circuit”. Next chapter presents our main contribution, which is 
alignment of FTA with SDM. 
 
 
Fig 8. Battery Powered Circuit Fault Analysis adopted from NASA HQ, Bill Vesely 
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CHAPTER 4. Alignment of Fault Tree Analysis to SDM  
	  
The main reason for the alignment of FTA to SDM is to see its capabilities with SDM. Following 
with this alignment we may have a chance to identify safety concerns at an early stage of 
software development and see potential safety problems from a different point of view. This 
alignment covers core concepts of SDM such as asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts, and 
risk-treatment related concepts.  
4.1 FTA Running Example 
 
This study applies FTA and its alignment with SDM for a company using their own mail server 
(Marquis, 2008) by following the steps defined separately for asset model, risk model and risk 
treatment model (Section 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4). As in the methodology also example split to three 
parts as asset model, risk model and risk treatment model.  
4.1.1 Asset Model  
In Fig.9, we present the context of an employee trying to send an email to a customer using 
company’s mail server in the modeled use case diagram. Asset model is the use case of the 
intended function (i.e., Send an E-mail to Customer) wants to be performed by actor (i.e., 
Employee) and it includes (i.e., Use Mail Server) (see Fig.9). Safety goal targets safety level (i.e., 
System adaptation), since there exist no diagram element for safety goal we illustrated it with 
octagon. The employee and the mail server are characterizing the asset (see Fig.2) of the system 
by employee being external to the accidental system and mail server as being part of the 
accidental system. Since employee is external to the accidental system we analyze boundaries of 
mail server that is being part of accidental system as hardware and software. 
 
Fig 9. Asset Model 
In our example system boundary (hardware) has vulnerabilities that belongs to asset to such as 
(i.e., no spare power supply)  (i.e., filters that can get clog) that causes to system failure when it 
exploits and the harm (i.e., mail server down for 3 hours in this example) causes is the system 
failure to be analyzed with risk modeling using FTA (see Table 9), since there exist no diagram 
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element for harm we created a new diagram element for it and illustrated with snip diagonal 
corner rectangle. 
Table 9. Failure & Vulnerability Analysis 
Failure Analysis Failure Mode Vulnerability 
Employee unable to send e-
mail 
Power supply failure -No spare power supply. 
-Filter that can get clog. 
 
4.1.2 Risk Model 
In Fig. 10, fault tree presents potential accidental scenario to the asset modeled for the use case in 
Fig 9 regarding the intended function (i.e., Send an email to a customer). Initial undesired event 
at the top of the tree is harm (i.e., Email server is down for 3 hours) asset gets. Intermediate event 
that is directly related to top event (i.e., Loss of power) is hazard to the asset also undeveloped 
event (i.e., Software failure) is hazard that is also directly related to top event. The branches of 
the tree, intermediate event (i.e., Loss of power) branches with one undeveloped event that is a 
hazard (i.e., No spare power supply) and one intermediate event that is harm (i.e., Power supply 
failure). And finally FTA completes with actual hazard that is an accident (i.e., Filter clogged).  
 
Fig 10. Risk Model 
4.1.3 Risk Treatment Model 
SDM supports safety policy, safety mechanism and its implementation. However, FTA and its 
alignment to SDM do not support the modeling of these concepts but safety requirement as a 
safety use case. Safety use case is represented as an attention symbol (see Fig 11). In Fig 10, we 
present fault tree of present accidental scenario to the asset. The use case (i.e., Use Mail Server) 
includes safety requirement (i.e., Maintain filter unclogged). Safety requirement eliminates the 
harm (i.e., E-mail server is down for 3h). And it ensures that email server will not be down 
accidentally due to clogged filters and our elimination of safety risk will establish adaptation 
ability to our system that is safety goal. 
 
 
33 
 
Fig 11. Safety Requirement Model 
4.2 Concept alignment of Misuse Cases and FTA with SDM 
 
To align FTA to SDM we created steps to be followed for each of these asset-related concepts, 
risk-related concepts, and risk-treatment related concepts. In some concepts we used helping 
hand of use cases technique. Also we neglected probability analysis of FTA from our alignment 
since for computerized systems especially for distributed systems it is difficult to assign useful 
probabilities to the events due to the fact that these systems have discrete, non-linear nature 
(Brooke et al., 2003). Instead we focused on how to carry out risk analysis, asset modeling, and 
risk treatment and how a system may fail. 
4.2.1 Misuse Case and FTA within the concept of SDM 
There exist no alignment of misuse cases or FTA with SDM. In this section we also describe the 
alignment of misuse cases and FTA with the concepts found in SDM. In Table 3 we made a 
comparison between similarities and differences between ISSRM and SDM and due to 
similarities illustrated in Table 3 we think that concepts from ISSRM that are already aligned 
with misuse cases can be used for similar concepts from SDM. Table 10 shows the alignment of 
misuse cases for security domain model made by (Soomro, 2012) to ISSRM and matches of 
concepts with SDM also how it aligned for safety with cross pollinations between FTA and 
misuse cases to cover safety concepts. First column shows SDM similar concepts together, 
second column shows ISSRM concepts, third column shows actual misuse case diagrams used to 
represent these concepts, fourth column shows misuse case elements to represent matching safety 
concepts with ISSRM, fifth column shows FTA elements to represent concepts for safety, sixth 
column shows SDM concepts, seventh column shows similar safety concepts together. When we 
consider ISSRM domain model and misuse case we can see that it is well aligned with security 
domain model, in a way that most of the concepts for ISSRM are covered by misuse cases. 
Regarding the fact that SDM and ISSRM have similarities, and our idea to make cross-
pollinations between techniques for safety and security we are going to use some misuse case 
diagram elements for SDM as it has shown in fourth column of Table 10. And for the rest of the 
safety concepts FTA will cover as it is showed in fifth column. To sum up, Table 10 will guide 
us which element to use when we switch to misuse cases for SDM, and which elements to use for 
FTA. And as the table shows by this way we will align the techniques we are planning to use for 
safety risk identification to SDM. 
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Table 10. Concept Analysis of Misuse Cases for ISSRM and SDM (NA- Not Applicable, concept not found) 
ISSRM                                               SDM 
Domain Model Misuse 
Case 
Misuse Case FTA Domain Model 
 
 
 
Asset 
Asset Actor, use 
case. 
Use case - Asset  
 
 
Asset 
Security 
criteria 
Security 
criterion 
hexagon. 
Safety element 
octagon 
- Safety goal 
- - Vulnerability 
use case 
- Vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Security risk Misuser, 
misuse case, 
vulnerability 
use case, use 
case, impact 
element. 
- Fault Tree Safety risk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Event Misuser, 
misuse case, 
asset 
Vulnerabilit
y use case. 
- Basic event Accident 
Threat Misuser and 
misuse case 
- Intermediate 
event, 
undeveloped 
event. 
Hazard 
Vulnerability Vulnerabilit
y use case 
- - - 
Impact Impact 
element 
Harm element Intermediate 
event. 
Harm 
Threat agent Misuser NA NA NA 
Attack 
method 
Misuse case NA NA NA 
 
 
Risk 
treatment 
Risk 
treatment 
- - - Safety policy  
 
Risk 
treatment 
Security 
requirement 
Security use 
case 
Safety use case - Safety 
requirement 
Control - - - Safety 
mechanism 
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In Table 11, we show relationship of FTA’s diagram elements and synonyms with SDM 
concepts. First column shows SDM similar concepts together, second column shows SDM 
concepts, third column shows FTA synonyms and fourth column shows FTA elements. 
Synonyms to SDM concepts for FTA found and extracted from (Fault Tree Handbook, 1981). As 
we can see in the table risk elements are covered very well since FTA is all about identifying all 
possible risks, faults, failures and failure ways. However, as it is expected in FTA there is no risk 
treatment terminology found. Also although asset mentioned as system, component participant 
like risk treatment there exist no way to model it with FTA. To sum up, from table 10 we can 
interfere that FTA produces terminology and ways focused on risk and these synonyms could be 
matched as it has shown in Table 10 with SDM concepts.   
Table 11. FTA and SDM 
 
SDM 
FTA 
Synonyms FTA element 
A
ss
et
 
 
Asset System, component, 
participant. 
- 
Safety goal - - 
Vulnerability Failure ways. - 
R
is
k   
Safety risk - Fault Tree 
Accident Failures. Basic event 
Hazard Faults, failure mode. Intermediate event, 
undeveloped event. 
Harm Failure effect Intermediate event. 
R
is
k 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
 
Safety policy - - 
Safety requirement - - 
Safety mechanism - - 
 
Regarding the fact that misuse cases are already aligned with ISSRM and similarities of it studied 
with SDM (Table 11), we illustrated a new table (Table 12) that covers all concept for safety 
domain with diagram elements from both FTA and misuse cases by making cross-pollination 
between techniques. In Table 12, first column represents SDM concepts, second column 
represents FTA element and third column represents misuse case diagram. 
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Table 12. SDM with FTA and Misuse Cases 
 
SDM 
FTA Misuse Case 
FTA element Misuse case diagram 
A
ss
et
 
 
Asset - Use case 
Safety goal - Safety element 
Vulnerability - - 
R
is
k   
Safety risk Fault Tree  
Accident Basic event - 
Hazard Intermediate event, 
undeveloped event. 
- 
Vulnerability - Vulnerability use case 
Harm Intermediate event. Impact element 
R
is
k 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
 
Safety policy - - 
Safety requirement - Safety use case 
Safety mechanism - - 
 
Coming to a conclusion from analysis we made (Table 10, 11, 12) we think that similar concepts 
from SDM and ISSRM are as shown in Table 13 and can be used for similar purposes with same 
or modified misuse case diagrams. Syntax to misuse case diagrams is given in Table 14 Table 15 
and Table 16. 
Table 13. Similar Concepts between ISSRM and SDM 
SDM ISSRM Misuse Case Diagram 
Asset Asset Actor, use case 
Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability use case 
Harm Impact Harm element 
Safety requirement Security requirement Safety use case 
 
4.2.2 Alignment of Asset Related Concepts 
In Table 14, we introduced safety oriented misuse case syntax to represent the SDM asset related 
concepts. Assets in SDM correspond to Actor and Use Case in safety oriented misuse case that 
supports includes relationship. The harm, which is a failure effect and initial state of the system 
caused by accident, exists to asset, illustrated with visual syntax we modeled that is diagonal 
rounded corner rectangle and it supports exist to relationship. And vulnerability which accident 
exploits asset has modeled as a filled grey use case as it is in SROMUC syntax (Soomro, 2012) 
and it supports has relationship. Safety goal modeled asset has to carry modeled as octagon. 
Steps needs to be followed for asset modeling are as below:  
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Steps 
1- Draw the use case for intended function including asset that needs to be protected from 
harm in it. 
2- Identify system boundaries; failure effect and vulnerabilities. 
3- Show safety goal that targets safety level for asset for one of these safety sub factors; 
asset protection, safety incident detection, safety incident reaction or system adaptation.  
4- Initiate harm exists to asset, which is a failure effect and initial state of the system, caused 
by accident. 
 
 
Table 14. Asset Related Concepts (C- Concept, R- Relationships) 
SDM Type Model Syntax with Misuse Cases 
Asset C 
 
Harm **Belongs to 
risk related 
concepts but 
has a 
representation 
in asset 
model 
 
Vulnerability C 
 
Safety goal C 
 
Supports R 
               
 
Exist to R 
 
Belongs to R 
 
Targets safety 
level 
R 
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4.2.3 Risk Model 
In Table 15, we introduced FTA syntax to represent the SDM risk related concepts. Harm 
represented as failure effect and supports causes relationship, hazard represented as faults and 
failures and supports due to and way result in relationships, accident represented as failure mode 
and the resulting tree of these components as safety risk. These concepts supports relationships 
between each other using gate symbols and line connectors (See Table 8).  Meta model for FTA 
is given in Fig 6.  As it is shown in Table 15 FTA syntax column, syntax for representing 
accident is basic event, hazard is intermediate event, undeveloped event or basic event, failure 
mechanism is intermediate event or undeveloped event and harm is intermediate event that is 
also top tree element. 
Steps needs to be followed for risk modeling and constructing the FTA is given below:  
Steps 
1- Place harm exist to asset that is undesired event to be analyzed to the top of tree as top 
event.  
2- Determine intermediate events faults, failures (hazards) that are directly related to top 
event, which may result in accident. 
3- Determine basic initiating faults, failures (hazards) that are directly related to each 
intermediate event until the FTA is complete. FTA completion means when accident 
defined and no further development is needed. 
 
4.2.4 Risk Treatment Model 
In Table 16, we introduced FTA syntax to represent SDM risk related concepts. Accident 
determined with basic event taken from FTA tree. Safety risk due to hazard way result in accident 
represented with use case that is a cause of harm. In order to illustrate safety requirement we 
created a safety use case by adding attention symbol in use case and it supports eliminates or 
reduces relationship to the safety risk. 
Steps 
1- Choose basic event, which is the accident from the FTA tree and think of safety 
requirement to eliminate the accident that causes harm. 
2- Draw harm and show exist to relationship of it with asset.  
3- Draw safety use case and add one of these four key words to it; maintain, achieve, cease 
or avoid representing safety requirement that has eliminates/reduces relationship with 
harm. 
4.3 Summary 
 
 In this chapter, we have presented alignment of FTA with SDM. In order to identify 
fundamentals of this alignment, we have analyzed concepts of ISSRM and SDM for security and 
safety risk management languages we plan to use for our alignment, which are FTA and Misuse 
Case (See Table 10-11-12). We presented step-by-step methodology of our alignment along with 
their concept diagrams. We have also presented the alignment with a running example (See 4.1).  
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Table 15. Risk Related Concepts (C- Concepts, R - Relationships) 
 
SDM Ty
pe 
Model Syntax for FTA 
Harm C 
 
Hazard C 
 
Accident C 
 
Safety Risk C 
 
Vulnerability C - 
Causes R - 
Way result in R 
 
Due to R 
 
Exploits R - 
Exists due to  R - 
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Table 16. Risk Treatment Related Concepts (C- Concept, R - Relationships) 
SDM Typ
e 
Model Syntax with Misuse Case 
Safety 
requirement 
C 
 
Safety 
mechanism 
C - 
Eliminates R 
 
Reduces R 
 
Fulfills  R - 
Specifies R - 
Establishes R - 
Elimination 
reduces 
R - 
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CHAPTER 5. CORRECTNESS OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
ALIGNMENT WITH SAFETY DOMAIN MODEL 
 
In this chapter, we validate our FTA alignment with SDM by examining the correctness of it. In 
order to examine correctness of our alignment, firstly we have gathered a scenario (Section 5.3) 
and extracted risk analysis models from this scenario then applied our alignment with it. 
Secondly, we presented a table that compares safety analysis done by Stålhane and us for boiler 
tank system (Stålhane & Sindre, pp. 425-426, 2007) and discuss the comparison. Finally we have 
lined up threads to validity.  
5.1 Goal of the Case Study 
 
The purpose of having this case study is to prove the correctness of our alignment for FTA with 
safety domain. This case study gives us chance for overview of our methodology so that we can 
check correctness of our method.  
5.2 Validation Design 
 
By assuming that the risk analysis done by Stålhane for the boiler tank scenarios is correct, we 
compare our FTA risk analysis with it and ask the validation question below:  
Validation Question: Which safety risk analysis is better for the “boiler tank scenario” FTA and 
its alignment to SDM or FMEA? 
In order to answer the validation question, we have created a validation design (Fig. 12) that 
follows three main steps. Firstly it extracts risk analysis done with FMEA and Misuse Case from 
the scenario (Section 5.3) and applies FTA. Secondly, we gather all the results together. And 
finally, we compare the results and create fundamentals for giving answer to validation question. 
 
Fig 12. Validation Design 
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5.3. Case Study Scenario 
 
We have needed a scenario that is applicable for our alignment that needs to be already applied 
for safety analysis with misuse cases or another technique that is tailored for safety. In our case 
FMEA and Misuse Case along with its diagram and textual representation. Therefore we picked 
the suitable scenario from (Stålhane & Sindre, pp. 425-427, 2007) as follows below: 
“Human operator functions related to an automated system used to keep the water level in a tank 
constant while delivering steam to an industrial process. Filling the tank through one valve and 
emptying it through another valve when needed do this. If the pressure in the tank becomes too 
high, a relief valve should open automatically as the pressure exceeds the critical pressure pre-set 
by the operator. The operator may also manually empty the tank (for instance if the relief valve 
fails to work when the pressure becomes too high) or manually fill the tank (if the automatic 
adjustment of water level does not work).” 
5.4 Model Extraction from Stålhane and Application of FTA with the Scenario 
 
5.4.1 Misuse Cases 
Fig 13. Shows a human operator whose aim is keeping the water level constant in a tank while 
delivering steam to the system by doing operations such as shown in use cases. In the Fig 13, it is 
also showed some misuse cases that could be done accidentally by the operator also system 
faults. These all misuse cases threatens on or more use cases in other words intended functions 
that wants to be accomplished by operator. The figure does not show threats or mitigations for a 
particular use case. Therefore there given textual representation of particular use case, which is 
“Empty tank manually”. The use case “Empty tank manually” also analyzed with FMEA in the 
paper and will be analyzed by us with FTA for techniques to be compared. 
 
Fig 13. Sample Safety Oriented Misuse Case Diagram for a Boiler Tank System taken from (Stålhane & Sindre, pp. 426, 
2007) 
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The textual representation shows (See Table 17) user actions, system responses, threats and 
mitigations for the use case empty tank manually and also exceptional paths that can be followed 
to achieve empty tank manually. Textual representation gives detailed risk analysis of particular 
use case and will be fundamental part for comparison with FTA.  
Table 17. Textual Representation of "Empty tank manually" Use Case adopted from (Stålhane & Sindre, pp. 427, 2007) 
Use case name “Empty tank manually”  
User actions System response Threats Mitigations 
 System alarms 
operator of high 
pressure 
System fails to raise alarm; 
Operator fails to notice alarm 
2 independent alarms; Use 
both sound and blinking 
lights 
Operator issues 
command to 
empty tank 
 Operator fails to react (e.g., 
incapacitated?). Operator gives 
wrong command, e.g., filling 
tank 
Alarm backup operator; 
Auto sanity check, disallow 
filling at high pressure 
 System opens 
valve to sewer 
System fails to relay command 
to valve; 
Valve is stuck 
 
Operator reads 
pressure 
 Operator misreads and stops 
tank emptying too soon 
Maintain alarm blinking 
until situation normal 
 Pressure returns 
to normal 
This is not achieved, see 
exceptions 
 
Operator stops 
tank emptying 
and logs the 
event. This ends 
the use case. 
   
Exceptional paths 
 Opening valve is 
insufficient to 
normalize pressure 
  
Operator issues 
command to 
reduce 
temperature 
 Operator gives wrong 
command, e.g., increase 
temperature 
Automatic sanity check, 
disallow temp increase at 
high pressure 
 Pressure returns to 
normal 
  
Operator logs 
the event. This 
ends the use 
case. 
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5.4.2 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
In Table 18, consequences of failure mode collected under two sub titles as local effect and 
system effect. Local effects are related with the component have been analyzed for and system 
effects are related with overall system effects that component is part of. Corrective action is 
possible mitigations to weaknesses in the system in order to handle with failure mode that is a 
system unit not working properly.  
Table 18. FMEA table for "Empty Tank Manually" Use Case adopted from (Stâlhane & Sindre, 2007) 
Unit “Empty tank manually” 
Failure mode Local effect System effect Corrective action 
Valve will not 
open 
Cannot empty tank. Accident – too 
high pressure 
• Valve status indicator 
• Duplicate valve 
• Must be possible to turn 
valve without motor 
Valve will not 
close 
Cannot fill tank No steam 
delivered 
 
5.4.3 Fault Tree Analysis for Boiler Tank System 
This study applies modeling with FTA for boiler tank system (Section 7.1) and illustrates the 
usage of FTA. It covers asset model (see Fig. 14), risk model (see Fig. 15), and safety 
requirement model (see Fig. 16). 
Asset Model 
In Fig. 16, we present the context of an operator trying to empty tank manually. Asset model is 
the use case of the intended function (i.e., Empty tank manually) includes (i.e., Turn valve) ) 
wants to be performed by actor (i.e., Operator). Safety goal targets safety goal (i.e., System 
adaptation) represented with hexagon. In our example system boundary that is system elements 
has vulnerabilities that belongs to asset such as (i.e., No duplicate valve), (i.e., There exist no 
way to turn valve without motor), (i.e., No valve status indicator) that causes to system failure 
when it exploits and the harm (i.e., Can not empty tank) causes the system failure to be analyzed 
with risk modeling using FTA, harm element represented with snip diagonal corner rectangle. 
 
Fig 14. Asset Model 
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Risk Model 
In Fig 15, we fault tree of present potential accidental scenario to the asset modeled with use case 
Fig. 15 regarding the intended function (i.e., Empty tank manually). Initial undesired event at the 
top of the tree is harm (i.e., Can not empty tank) asset gets. Intermediate event that is directly 
related to top event (i.e., Valve is stuck) is a hazard and also undeveloped event (i.e., Operator 
gives wrong command) is ate hazard that is also directly related to top event. And finally FTA 
completes with actual hazard that is an accident (i.e., Pressure too high) 
 
Fig 15. Risk Model 
Safety Requirement Model 
In Fig. 16, we present fault tree of present accidental scenario to the asset. The use case (i.e., 
Empty tank manually) includes safety requirement (i.e., Achieve turn valve without motor) 
represented as an attention symbol. Safety requirement eliminates the harm (i.e., Can not empty 
tank). And safety requirement ensures that tank valve will be able to open without motor and our 
elimination of safety risk will establish adaptation ability to our system that is safety goal. 
 
 
Fig 16. Safety Requirement Model 
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5.5 Results Comparison 
 
Assuming that the risk analysis done by Stålhane for the boiler tank scenarios is correct, we 
compare our FTA risk analysis with it. Table 19 is presenting this comparison. In Table 19, first 
column shows SDM concepts; second column shows our safety risk analysis with two sub 
sections that are safety techniques we used as FTA and Misuse Case. Third column showing 
Stålhane’s safety risk analysis with three sub columns first Synonyms defining similar concept 
meanings found in (Stålhane & Sindre, 2007) second and third are safety techniques FMEA and 
Misuse Case used.  
From the Table 19, we see that our safety risk analysis with FTA and its alignment to SDM can 
elicit concepts as asset, accident, hazard, harm and safety requirements and they support with 
Stålhane’s Safety Risk Analysis for the concept elements asset, accident, hazard, harm and safety 
requirement. This results support proves us correctness of our safety risk analysis with FTA.  
Furthermore, our safety risk analysis with FTA and its alignment to SDM can elicit some other 
concepts elements as well such as safety risk, vulnerabilities and safety goal.  
To sum up, from the comparison presented in the Table 19 and bullet points above it is clear that 
Stålhane’s safety risk analysis supports our risk analysis with FTA and its alignment to SDM, 
which is validating the correctness of our method since we assume that results from Stålhane are 
correct.  
Answers to validation questions: 
Validation Question: Which safety risk analysis is better for the “boiler tank scenario” FTA and 
its alignment to SDM or FMEA? 
Answer: Risk analyses done with FMEA and Misuse Cases for “Empty Tank Manually” use 
case supports with our risk analysis with FTA and its alignment to SDM. Moreover, FTA elicits 
some more concepts such as vulnerability, safety goal and safety risk. Regarding this answer 
coming from validation question, we could say that our alignment is correct and better in terms 
of SDM concepts it elicits.  
5.6 Threats to validity 
 
We follow some certain steps while performing FTA but at the same time we are aware of some 
conventions we used, so a random user would have some problems in understanding some of 
these and this may result with a wrong result or complications as mentioned below. 
• When we do asset model with FTA, we include system component to the intended 
function wants to be performed, alignment is not prepared for purposes component not 
known for intended function. 
• While doing risk modeling with FTA, it would be hard to predict all undeveloped hazards 
also some event names may remain unclear if user is not cautious about it. 
• When doing safety requirement modeling user would have hard times in understanding 
that there needs to be drawn one safety requirement model for each accidental situation 
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such that if fault tree finds many accidents that results with same harm user will be in 
need of drawing many different safety requirements.  
To sum up, if a random user of FTA and it’s alignment to SDM does not recognize the 
following conventions we have while understanding the methodology we proposed then user 
may get wrong results or complications. 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
In order to control the correctness of our FTA and its alignment to SDM, we used a case scenario 
about boiler tank system and compared the results with Stålhane’s safety risk analysis, which we 
assumed to be correct. In detail, for the use case “Empty tank manually” that is an intended 
function to be implement, we have made risk analysis and compared with analyses (models) from 
(Stâlhane & Sindre, 2007). Results comparisons we have made acknowledged the correctness of 
FTA and it’s alignment to SDM. Finally we have reported threats to validity. From overall case 
study, what we have understood is our methodology is correct when the system wants to be 
analyzed boundaries known. However, it is not tested in terms of ease of usage or performance as 
part of future work these are the factors to be improved.  
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Table 19. Comparison of Safety Risk Analyses for Boiler Tank System Scenario (Stâlhane & Sindre, 2007). 
 
SDM 
Our Safety Risk Analysis 
(Section 7.2) 
Stålhane’s Safety Risk Analysis 
(Stålhane et al., pp. 425-426, 
2007). 
FTA  Use Case FMEA Use Case 
A
ss
et
 
 
Asset - Empty tank 
manually 
- Empty tank 
manually 
Safety goal - System 
adaptation 
- - 
R
is
k   
Safety risk -Since the 
pressure is too 
high valve get 
stuck and 
operator can not 
empty the tank 
- - - 
Accident Pressure is too 
high 
- Pressure is too 
high 
- 
Hazard Valve is stuck - Valve is stuck Valve is stuck 
Vulnerability - -No duplicate 
valve 
-There exist 
no way to 
turn valve 
without 
motor  
-No valve 
status 
indicator 
- - 
Harm Can not empty 
tank 
Can not 
empty tank 
Can not empty 
tank 
- 
R
is
k 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
 
Safety policy - - - - 
Safety 
requirement 
- Achieve turn 
valve without 
motor 
-Valve status 
indicator 
-Duplicate 
valve 
-Must be 
possible to turn 
valve without 
motor 
- 
Safety 
mechanism 
- - - - 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
  
We presented security and safety domains since we foresee that integration between security and safety 
starts in their domain models. And then, we presented extracted definitions for security and safety. 
Security domain (ISSRM) concepts definitions are taken from (Dubois et al., 2010). Safety domain 
concept definitions are collected and written by us. Then we have given sample to safety and security 
domain concepts and compared domain models in terms of their differences and similarities. Because we 
thought that similar concepts can be used for similar purposes. After this, we presented risk identification 
techniques from security and safety, as from security: misuse cases, mal-activity diagrams and secure 
Tropos and form safety: FTA, HAZOP, FMEA and PHA. We chose these techniques to present because 
these are categorized to be most frequently used risk identification techniques (Raspotnig, et al., 2013). 
Then, we presented step-by-step usage of FTA together with its ground rules and construction sample 
since we decided to choose FTA for the integration regarding these facts that its easy to use and 
understand also frequently used safety technique (Fault Tree Handbook, 1981). 
 
After analyzing security and safety domain models and presenting the risk identification techniques they 
have, we realized the need of FTA and its alignment for the SDM. Thus, we have presented alignment of 
asset related, risk and risk treatment models of FTA for SDM. While making these alignments for asset 
model, we used misuse cases to represent the model because its aligned with ISSRM and since we think 
that some concepts from ISSRM are similar to safety such as asset, vulnerability, impact we thought of 
modeling asset with misuse cases is convenient. For risk model, we used FTA and elicit hazards, harm 
and accidents. Then, we have developed safety requirements for the risks we analyzed with FTA and 
modeled them with misuse cases. 
 
To validate our work we have gathered a scenario (Stålhane et al., 2007) that is suitable and tested it for 
FTA and its alignment with SDM and then compared the results with Stålhane. 
 
6.1 Limitations 
 
In this study we are having limitations of the scope. This study focuses on two main titles first 
one is security and safety domain models along with their similarities & difference and second 
one is FTA and its alignment to SDM. The alignment of FTA with SDM includes interplay with 
Misuse Case in order to cover asset model and safety risk treatment model. However, we have 
not made an attempt to use a different security technique for modeling asset or creating safety 
risk model. Also we have not covered one of the usages of FTA, which is probability analysis of 
the risks that may arise and leave it out of our context.  
We remain some levels for future research like carrying the interplay further by using a different 
security technique or creating an integrated technique between FTA and Misuse Cases in order to 
elicit security and safety problems alongside, in a way that considering safety as a security 
criterion such as confidentiality, integrity, availability and safety (Winther et al., 2001).  
6.2 Conclusion 
 
The idea for current thesis was inspired by two main research questions. First research question 
was similarities and differences between security and safety domain models and how can they be 
benefitted from each other. Based on the comparison made to capture similarities and differences 
between domain models (See Table 3), we have made a conclusion that security and safety asset 
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modeling can be done together and this could give us a chance to make security and safety 
analysis concurrently. And this exposed us our second research question, which is what kind of 
interplay can be done between security and safety techniques for security and safety analysis? In 
order to answer this research question we chose most suitable and frequently used (Raspotnig, et 
al., 2013) security and safety risk analysis techniques as Misuse Case and FTA. We claim Misuse 
Case and FTA to be the most suitable identification techniques to make interplay with because; 
firstly Misuse Case has alignment with ISSRM (Soomro, 2012). Secondly, FTA and Misuse Case 
are frequently used risk identification techniques (Raspotnig, et al., 2013). And finally, regarding 
the fact that FTA starts with initial undesired event that is harm to system and Misuse Case gives 
us chance to indicate harm in asset model to make risk analysis with FTA. 
After deciding which techniques to make interplay with for security and safety analysis, we have 
decided to align FTA with SDM because security technique we made interplay with was aligned 
with ISSRM (Soomro, 2012) but safety technique was not and for interplay between techniques it 
was needed to understand capabilities and limitations of FTA with SDM. From the technique 
analyses we made for FTA on its usage, we realized that there was no way to indicate asset 
model and safety risk treatment model with FTA but risk analysis. And this exposed us to use 
security technique that is Misuse Case to cover asset model and safety risk treatment. By 
capturing risks with FTA, modeling asset and safety risk treatment with Misuse Case we have 
aligned FTA with SDM. We illustrated usage of our alignment with a running example (See 
Section 4.1).  
In order to validate our work, we have controlled correctness of FTA and its alignment to SDM. 
We have gathered a scenario, and extracted safety risk analysis from this scenario then compared 
whether risk analysis extracted from the scenario support our risk analysis and identified threats 
to validity.   
 
6.3 Future Work 
 
When the overall thesis considered a specific future work could be realized, which is integration 
between Misuse Case and FTA. Because at the moment we have fundamentals for this 
integration since Misuse Case alignment exist with ISSRM (Soomro, 2012) and FTA alignment 
exist with SDM. Meaning that now a methodology can be created in order for further analysis of 
security and safety together regarding the fact that “The increased use of ICT-systems, in 
particular combined with the tendency to put ”everything” on “the net”, gives rise to serious 
concerns regarding security, not just in relation to confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(CIA), but also as a possible cause of safety problems”  (Winther et al., 2001, p.1). Therefore we 
think that this could be a challenge and if the work is done it could be a sample for integration 
attempts of security and safety.  
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